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Dear Editors, and Reviewers, 
 
We appreciate the opportunity you gave us to undertake revisions to improve our manuscript: 
“The Personality Traits of Populist Leaders and Their Foreign Policies: Hugo Chávez and 
Donald Trump” - SQ-2020-08-0460. We have followed closely the two reviewers’ suggestions, 
and also the editors’ helpful direction and emphasis on what changes to introduce in this revised 
version.  
 
We have also edited the text: cut down the introduction, adopted some major changes in parts 
of the text to fit the suggestions of the reviewers, and preserved a tidy text in terms of structure, 
organization, and word count. We believe the resulting revised manuscript is greatly improved 
over the previous version. We explain the changes we have made below, following the helpful 
decision letter from the editors: 
 
The editors and reviewers mention and encourage us to advance in a more direct way how our 
study on personal characteristics of populist leaders can connect and shed light on broader 
International Relations debates specially to engage a wider academic audience. We engage 
with literature that asserts populist leaders tend to undermine the pillars of the international 
liberal order from within and outlines the risks of their actions on this matter. We also connect 
our work with recent IR scholarship on the notion of “international order,” on which populist 
leaders’ actions informed by their personal characteristics can also shed further light. We have 
brought these debates into the paper in relation to our argument for the key importance of 
personal characteristics of leaders in the introduction, literature review, and in the conclusion 
through outlining a future research agenda. 
 
Moreover, we also emphasize even more the notion and idea in the existing literature that 
populist leaders might tend to adopt more conflict-driven foreign policy behavior, limiting the 
possibilities of enduring cooperation. This is something that impacts on the stability of the 
international liberal order. This aspect was the core of our argument in the previous version but 
now we take it further, as explained above. We have rephrased the central question of our work 
slightly to capture in a much better way the main goal of our paper, which is scrutinizing the 
noncooperation and even hostile behavior of populist leaders in international politics. In 
addition, we also connect the mentioned IR debates to the notion of populist leaders and their 
personality traits by drawing on the analytical benefits of Leadership Trait Analysis (LTA).  
 
Following the recommendation of both reviewers and the editors we have included a much 
higher number of spontaneous source materials for both Trump and Chávez. Now we use 
material that was delivered for different types of audiences, contexts, policy domains, and in 
different time settings. We agree with the reviewers that including more material secures 
validity and reliability of the results and its subsequent interpretation. In addition, we also detail 
much more clearly our method, research design, how we use the material, and how we comply 
with the methodological standards of the LTA approach. 
 
Considering we increased the number of words employed for the analysis and amplified the 
scope of the verbal material we used to carry out the assessment, some of the scores obtained 
by the leaders changed. The variation in leaders’ scores modified some of the results. Hence, 
the analysis in this new version reflects these changes. We now put more emphasis on the 
potential effects of leaders’ unusual profiles in foreign policy decision-making processes, as 
this could be an important factor explaining their behavior (compared with the norming group 
of world leaders). We used literature on LTA to explain why extremely high and low scores 
for certain traits can make cooperation difficult.  
 
With these new results, we addressed the concern expressed by Reviewer 2 about the apparent 
disconnect between the study’s findings and the evidence about the two leaders. We agreed 
with the reviewer’s assessment on Chávez’s authoritarian characteristics and his actions to gain 
more power. However, personality traits can be better understood when considering a leader’s 
combined personal characteristics. In line with our main argument, a central component of 
populist leaders’ rhetoric is their strong focus on relationships and maintaining people’s 
support. A crucial element in the Socialism of the 21st Century ideology advanced by Chávez 
is the empowerment of the Venezuelan people. In this sense, his actions both domestically and 
in foreign policy were always justified by this alleged desire to give more power to those who 
were oppressed under previous governments. In this context, the attacks he received from the 
opposition were generally portrayed as an attempt to cease the revolutionary project that was 
intended to put the people of Venezuela at the center of all decision-making processes. 
Chávez’s low scores and Trump’s average scores on this trait are in line with what the literature 
describes as the “people-elite-general will” triad where the actions of populist leaders are 
framed as representing the general will of the people, not as a personal enterprise to seek power.   
In terms of Trump’s scores on “conceptual complexity,” which were flagged by both reviewers, 
they varied with the new sample of verbal material, although not substantially. In this case, 
Trump appears as having leaning high scores on this trait (instead of high). In our analysis we 
stressed that while high levels of this trait are commonly associated with leaders who are 
capable of considering multiple perspectives, the literature also shows that high complexity 
may also result in a leader who is overwhelmed by information—which could lead to poor 
decision-making (see our reference in the main text to the work of Schafer and Crichlow 2010 
on this specific matter). Specifically, in response to one of the comments made by Reviewer 1, 
while conceptual complexity may reflect some aspects of a leader’s cognitive style, this trait 
does not measure intelligence; if the previous version of our paper somehow hinted at that, it 
was a mistake and we have changed it.  
 
A comment on the stability of personality traits. As you will see, our results changed when we 
modified the sample of verbal remarks employed in the analysis. While personality traits 
remain relatively stable over time, this does not mean that they remain static during a person’s 
lifetime. Personality traits may change with age, context, and personal circumstances. While 
LTA provides a good tool to assess leaders’ personality and help predict behavior, the 
technique is not exempt from the common problems that Psychology faces in assessing 
people’s characteristics in clinical, educational, and work contexts. In this sense, leaders’ traits 
may vary depending on the policy area in question. The LTA literature has shown that some 
people use contextual cues to determine what they do, which make them more prone to their 
trait scores changing depending on the situation. In this sense, considering Chavez’s and 
Trump’s openness to information, the variation in some of their scores does not come as a 
surprise.  
 
We have also expanded on our case selection and clarified what a study on Global North and 
Global South populist leaders and their left-right ideologies can bring to the study of populism 
in Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) and IR.  
 
Other changes suggested: 
• We have toned down the claim that populism in IR should be all about “traits,” as one 
of the reviewers rightly questions. We have rather framed our contribution as an 
approach that can easily supplement other studies of populism in IR that adopt an 
ideational, strategy, or discursive approach as well as on the erosion of the liberal 
international order. These are the dominant theoretical frames in populism in FPA/IR.   
• We have also shortened the introduction as well as edited the language. We have relied 
on a native English-speaking language editor as neither of the authors are so 
themselves.  
• We have also used a different set of literature produced by female scholars working on 
populism in IR and LTA and foreign policy to reduce possible gender biases.  
Overall, we believe this new round of revisions have improved the quality of our paper in 
comparison to the previous version. We are grateful to the reviewers and editors for their 
suggestions that have made us rethink and improve substantial aspects of the theoretical and 
methodological pillars of the paper.  


























THE PERSONALITY TRAITS OF POPULIST LEADERS AND THEIR FOREIGN POLICIES: 




This paper seeks to advance the study of the nexus of populism and foreign policy by showing 
the connection between the personality traits of the leader and the foreign policy behavior of 
the state that they represent. It focuses on the political personality profiles of two populist 
leaders who can be characterized as antiplural, Hugo Chávez and Donald Trump, as a way to 
empirically further substantiate the recent research agenda on populism in world politics. The 
paper builds the two populist leaders’ political profiles through the use of the Leader Trait 
Analysis methodological approach. It contends that there are patterns in populist leaders’ 
personalities that can act as key drivers of their noncooperative and conflict-inducing behavior 
in foreign policy. The results show the characteristics that appear as the strongest predictors of 
their behavior in the international arena are their low task orientation and high focus on 
relationships.  
 










The phenomenon of populist leadership has received increasing attention in International 
Relations (IR). Part of this attention is due to the international actions of former United States 
president Donald Trump (2017–2021). However, populist leadership has a long tradition in 
Latin America too. While Trump undermined the stability of the liberal international order and 
his actions have been depicted as illogic (Drezner 2020), the same can also be said about the 
president of Venezuela, Hugo Chávez (1999–2013). He escalated tensions with the US to fuel 
his socialist project at home and competed with Brazil as a regional power by offering 
alternative models of regional order and institutions. Chávez also threatened to withdraw 
Venezuela’s membership of the Organization of American States on different occasions. He 
even mobilized troops on the border with Colombia to support his ally Ecuador instead of 
adopting a mediating role, as other South American countries did. Similarly, Trump’s relations 
with the world have been characterized as unpredictable and erratic (Drezner 2020). His actions 
would undermine the stability of the liberal international order when, for instance, he withdrew 
from the nuclear deal with Iran, affecting the stability of the Middle East and the security of 
the US’s key allies in the region. Trump also adopted economic nationalism, targeted friends 
and foes through tariff wars, and withdrew the US from key climate change accords. He also 
shamed NATO member states for not contributing enough to the costs of this institution and 
threatened on several occasions to withdraw US participation of it.  
 
These examples show that some antiplural populist leaders tend to adopt noncooperative, 
conflict-driven, and even hostile behavioral patterns in the international system. Their 
somewhat unpredictable and sometimes erratic behavior also amplify the difficulties for other 
states to establish stable patterns of cooperation with these leaders. How, then, can IR 
scholarship make sense of these types of behaviors by certain populist leaders? While some of 
these behaviors can be attributed to the ideologies that align with populist projects, such as 
nationalism, socialism, and even a fierce defense of sovereignty, these approaches can be 
complemented with studies also offering an assessment of the psychology of populist leaders.  
 
While not all populist leaders’ foreign policy behavior can be explained by personality traits 
alone, we contend that the latter can help understand their noncooperative and conflict-
inducing actions in the international system. We understand this type of behavior as a series of 
threats and actions taken by the leader that undermine collaboration between states within 
multilateral institutions, as well as the actions that undermine bilateral relations—ranging from 
the use of threats, to coercive measures, to possible military action. Thus, this paper addresses 
the following question: Are there patterns in populist leaders’ personalities that can act as key 
drivers of their noncooperative and conflict-inducing behavior?  
 
We argue that the tendency of populists to react in hostile ways to regional and international 
peers and institutions starts from the psychological characteristics of the leader, and not just 
from the type of ideology driving the populist government around notions of people versus 
elite and the general will. We tackle the research question with the Leadership Trait Analysis 
(LTA) framework pioneered by Hermann (1980, 2003). This approach is an at-a-distance 
assessment technique to study the personality profiles of leaders through the use of seven traits. 
Within this framework, we argue that populists’ personal characteristics tend to differ from 
other world leaders; further, in line with the populist triad “people-elite-general will,” these 
individuals’ reasons for seeking power play a relevant role in the populist leadership style seen.  
 
We focus on Trump and Chávez as cases from the Global North and Global South respectively. 
Most of the existing studies on populist foreign policy center exclusively on leaders from either 
the Global North or the Global South but not on both in tandem (e.g. Chryssogelos 2017; 
Destradi and Plagemann 2019; Plagemann and Destradi 2019; Wehner and Thies 2021; 
Wojczewski 2019a, 2019b). The study of Trump and his unpredictable behavior has been 
analyzed as a unique case in IR (see Drezner 2020). However, when compared with other cases 
from the Global South such as the one of Chávez we can draw important lessons on the 
importance of personal characteristics for understanding states’ international behavior through 
the figure of the leader. A study that brings together these two cases is but an initial step and 
calls for more comparative work to be done on populist leaders beyond their individual 
ideologies. In fact, an agent-centered perspective like the one adopted here can also contribute 
to and complement recent debates in IR on revisionism and the patterns of instability vis-à-vis 
the international liberal order that populist leaders tend to bring with their actions (see e.g. 
Lake, Martin, and Risse 2021; Adler-Nissen and Zarakol 2020; Nye 2017; Ikenberry 2018; 
Jervis et al. 2018). 
 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows: First, we assess the different 
conceptualizations of populism in Comparative and International Politics and show their lack 
of attention to the personal attributes of the leader. Second, we offer a brief theorization on 
leadership in general and populist leadership in particular, as well as outline our expectations 
in light of the analytical benefits of LTA. Third, we specify our research design. Fourth, we 
conduct an empirical analysis to determine populist leaders’ personality traits that can help 
explain their noncooperative and conflict-inducing foreign policy behavior, which seems 
detrimental to the stability of the international liberal order. Fifth and finally, we offer a 
comparison of our cases and identify some avenues for future research on populist figures’ 
personalities and their attitudes toward the international order at the interplay of FPA and IR 
debates. 
 
POPULISM IN COMPARATIVE AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICS  
 
The study of populism in international politics has been built out of the different theories of 
the phenomenon within Comparative Politics. The most used approaches have been the 
ideational and discursive ones, while not much ink has been expended on the study of populism 
as a political strategy in international politics. In the ideational strand, populism is defined as 
a “thin-centered” ideology that usually coexists with “thicker” ideologies such as socialism or 
liberalism or even other “thinner” ones like nationalism (Mudde and Kaltwasser 2017, 5; 
Destradi and Plagemann 2019). Meanwhile, the discursive approach follows the work of 
Laclau (2005), in which the phenomenon of populism becomes a structuring discourse for a 
new reality as a consequence of dislocation in the hegemonic discourse. People, elite, and 
general will are empty signifiers that are filled with meaning by the discursive practice of the 
leader (see Laclau 2005). In the political strategy approach, the leader articulates a political 
strategy to connect with the people as a way to achieve and then retain political power. If 
anything, the leader goes beyond their own core beliefs to perform a strategic act that 
consolidates their power—depending on the opportunities they create and the context they face 
(Weyland 2001).  
 
These three classical understandings of populism in Comparative Politics share a common 
core: the triad of people, elite, and general will. “The people” is an abstract and diffuse social 
construction that gives plenty of room for the populist leader to stretch, manipulate, and 
construct its meaning. “The elite” is usually the political and economic elite of the country; 
when it comes to the global dimension, references are to a “cosmopolitan elite” (Wehner and 
Thies 2020). Thus, populism for some leaders is about rescuing the native values of the country 
and people in contrast to a cosmopolitan elite that rules and undermines the people as sovereign 
of a given country or region (see Chryssogelos 2020). Finally, “general will” reflects the 
populist leader’s belief that only they know what the people desire and want (see Mudde and 
Kaltwasser 2017). This triad is thus expected to be present and manifest in the rhetoric of the 
populist leader, and, above all, in the foreign policy behavior of the state under their mandate 
(Wehner and Thies 2020). The internationalization of this triad in global politics is what makes 
the latter populist in nature. 
 
The above-explained three streams of research in Comparative Politics have been brought into 
the study of populism in International Politics too. Although populist leadership is a present 
and pressing phenomenon in different national settings around the world, the eventual 
manifestations of it, specifically in the international politics of a given country, have only 
recently started to receive academic attention (see Chryssogelos 2017; Destradi and Plagemann 
2019; Stengel, MacDonald, and Nabers 2019; Wehner and Thies 2020; Stengel, MacDonald, 
and Nabers 2019). Not much has been said, then, on the relationship between the personality 
profiles of populist leaders and their international behavior. Most of the scholarly interest in 
populism and international politics has revolved around whether there is a relationship between 
the two, what kind of influence populism has on international politics, how populist leaders 
undermine and are a threat to the liberal order, as well as the type of discourses and ideologies 
that populist leaders advance internationally (see Stengel, MacDonald, and Nabers 2019; 
Chryssogelos 2017; Destradi and Plagemann 2019). In fact, the personality traits of the so-
called populist leader and whether they account for the foreign policy patterns of a given state 
have not yet received due scholarly attention.  
Drezner (2020) advances the study of the psychological aspects informing the leadership style 
of Trump. He shows how his unique personality traits intersected with the growing prerogatives 
that the US presidency enjoys as an institution. Drezner uses three traits to study Trump’s 
presidential style: quick temper, short concentration span, and poor impulse control. The 
conclusion is that: “As President, Trump has acted like many toddlers: he is bad at building 
structures, but fantastic at making a complete mess of existing ones” (Drezner 2020, 400). 
While this work shows the potential to develop a research agenda on the psychology of populist 
leaders, its claim that Trump’s personality traits are unique makes using it in comparisons with 
other leaders difficult.  Likewise,  Destradi and Plagemann (2019) show how populist leaders 
tend toward the personalization of the foreign policy-making process. They also posit that the 
impact populist projects have on global politics depends on a thick ideology being in play. It 
is thus the combination of thin-thick ideology that explains foreign policy behavior, rather than 
existing personality traits. Nevertheless, Destradi and Plagemann (2019) call in their study for 
more empirical analysis to uncover the political personality profiles of populist leaders. 
 
Despite the abovementioned calls for psychological studies on populist leaders in international 
politics, the research focus has been so far on whether there is such a thing as a “populist 
foreign policy” and, if this is indeed the case, what distinguishes it from a nonpopulist one.  
Verbeek and Zaslove (2017) assess the relationship between populism and foreign policy and 
conclude there is no one type thereof. The core ideology informing the populist project is key 
for the different types of foreign policy seen. The ideology that populism is paired with is thus 
integral to elucidating whether a populist foreign policy is for or against the liberal order 
(Wehner and Thies 2021). Similarly, Stengel, MacDonald, and Nabers (2019) provide an 
understanding of the manifestations of populism in world politics and highlight the different 
existing gaps in the study of the nexus of populism and foreign policy—but without directly 
referring to leaders’ traits, profiles, and belief systems.  
Other works using the thin-centered concept of populism also go in a different direction from 
that of the leader figure and their personal characteristics. Sagarzazu and Thies (2019) look at 
the populist rhetoric of Chávez as driven by anti-imperialist notions. Further, the type of 
discourse and rhetoric that populist actors unfold in the foreign policy realm is also crucial in 
the researching thereof (Wojczewski 2019a; Zeemann 2019). Others evaluate the utility of the 
concept of “populism” and tend to characterize it at the international level as “antiplural” 
(Chryssogelos 2017; Plagemann and Destradi 2019). Moreover, some have analyzed populist 
movements that seek to advance an anticosmopolitan agenda and thus target and undermine 
the European Union integration project (Ivaldi 2018; Stavrakakis et al. 2017). More recently, 
the journal Foreign Affairs has become home to a number of analyses of how populist leaders 
are a threat to liberal democracy and thus the current international order (Colgan and Keohane 
2017; Nye 2017; Zakaria 2016).  
 Özdamar and Ceydilek (2020) are an exception here, as they unpack the sociocognitive aspects 
of different populist leaders in Europe using the Operational Code Analysis framework to 
establish whether these individuals are overall cooperative or hostile toward other actors. 
However, this study includes only one leader who has made it to power in a European country: 
Viktor Orbán in Hungary. The rest of the cases—such as Marine Le Pen (France), Geert 
Wilders (Netherlands), Nigel Farage (Britain), Jimmie Åkesson (Sweden), Frauke Petry 
(Germany), and Norbert Hofer (Austria)—have not made it to power as head of state and/or 
government. Therefore, unlike this study, we intend to assess the personality traits of two 
populist leaders who did make it to power—as it is here where they were formally able to put 
their own imprint on the foreign policy-making process and thus affect both regional and 
international orders. 
Thus, the International Politics literature goes in different directions per the varying concepts 
and theories of populism articulated within Comparative Politics. Above all, these works tend 
to overlook such leaders’ characteristics and personality traits. If populists advance antiplural, 
anticosmopolitan, and antidemocratic agendas, or possibly quite the opposite, then in all these 
cases the leader’s characteristics may have some degree of influence on the decision-making 
processes—and thus they should be considered as a key aspect in the study of the nexus of 
populism and international politics. Likewise, personality traits are expected to shape, affect, 




LEADERSHIP STYLE AND PERSONALITY OF POPULIST LEADERS 
 
It is hard to think about populist leaders without associating them with specific characteristics 
and a particular style of rule. The study of populist leadership styles has drawn scholarly 
attention from numerous fields and perspectives. For instance, these individuals’ particular 
communication style and rhetoric have been widely described (Ahmadian, Azarshahi, and 
Paulhus 2017; Ernst et al. 2019; Bos and Brants 2014; Jagers and Walgrave 2007; Nai 2018). 
Heinisch (2003) refers to populists’ style as generally drawing on agitation, spectacular acts, 
exaggeration, and calculated provocations, as well as also being characterized by using 
recourse to common-sense arguments, stereotyping, and extreme emotions to induce fear. On 
the other hand, Bos and Brants (2014) describe the populist style as a case of being 
straightforward, emphasizing decisiveness, and criticizing others.  
 
Populist leadership has been usually conflated with charismatic leadership and the idea of a 
strongman/strongwoman leading the masses while possessing the capacity to impose decisions 
in a top-down manner (Weyland 2001). However, there is much greater variety in leadership 
types among populists than just the strongman/strongwoman. Populist leaders need to be 
creative in differentiating themselves from the established elite that they question, and they do 
so by highlighting their outsider status from political life through gender, ethnic, and 
professional markers (Mudde and Kaltwasser 2017, 68). Thus, populism refers to leadership as 
the need for “the most extraordinary individuals to lead the most ordinary of people” (Taggart 
2000, 1).  
 
From a psychological perspective, some scholarly work has been done to unravel the specific 
personality traits of populist leaders, although not by using LTA. For instance, Nai and 
Martínez i Coma (2019) use personality inventories to assess populist leaders, finding that they 
score low on agreeableness, emotional stability, and conscientiousness. These leaders also 
scored higher on extraversion, narcissism, psychopathy, and Machiavellianism. Some specific 
work has already been conducted on the two leaders addressed in this paper. Fortunato, 
Hibbing, and Mondak (2018) stress the relevance of Trump’s personality, indicating that his 
campaign was about his personality, the voter’s own one, and the connection between the two. 
Similarly, Nai and Maie (2018) also assessed Trump’s personality during his election campaign 
and found that he was rated very low on agreeableness, conscientiousness, and emotional 
stability, average on openness, and very high on extraversion and the “dark triad” (narcissism, 
psychopathy, and Machiavellianism).  
 
Meanwhile, research conducted on Chávez’s personality using well-established psychological 
tools is less prolific. However, it is possible to find references to his leadership style to explain 
his political behavior and support from constituents. Weyland (2003) argues that Venezuela’s 
domestic crisis created a psychological need to believe in salvation and a potential bearer of it. 
These problems allowed for situational charisma, which Chávez used to boost his populist 
leadership style. Weyland (2003) also suggests that Chávez’s support depended partially on his 
own personal characteristics, such as crude diction and belligerent rhetoric. In addition, 
Chávez’s oratorical and improvisation skills are usually recognized as relevant features of his 
leadership style. Frajman (2014) refers to Chávez’s charisma and strong personality as 
elements that helped maintain an emotionally charged connection with his followers. He 
stresses here Chávez’s loquaciousness and overconfidence, as he would talk to the public 
weekly for hours on end for over a decade.  
 
While the studies presented above are helpful to understand the need to determine and unpack 
the key psychological features that help explain populists’ behavior, these traits have hitherto 
not been directly connected to their international politics. Populist leaders, especially those that 
rely on antiplural and antiliberal rhetoric, are presented as undermining the international order, 
as their actions enhance patterns of noncooperation. In other words, understanding how the 




POLITICAL LEADERS AND LTA IN FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS (FPA) 
 
The assessment of political leaders has a long tradition in FPA. One of the first works to initiate 
the systematic analysis of leaders as decision-makers in foreign policy appeared in 1954 with 
Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin (Hermann 2009; Hudson 2002; Levy 2003). It acknowledges the 
importance of focusing on decision-makers, for it is the way individuals perceive or interpret 
events that determines the behavior of a particular state and its foreign policy decisions 
(Hermann 2009; Levy 2003). The study of personality or political behavior makes sense when 
we consider the central axiom of political psychology, namely that the actions taken by a leader 
are shaped and channeled by their personality and particular perceptions, memories, judgments, 
goals, means of expression, and emotional self-regulation (Winter 2003).  
 
Hudson (2013) has argued that in the field of international relations what happens between 
nations originates from decisions made by humans, whether acting individually or collectively. 
Thus the foundations of international relations are the human beings who make those decisions, 
who cannot be thought of either as strict rational actors or as abstract entities equivalent to the 
state. People thus affect how international issues are framed, the options considered, the 
choices made, and what is ultimately implemented (Hermann 2009). Consequently, the study 
of political leaders has been approached from different perspectives. These studies have 
focused on leaders’ personal characteristics, cognitions, motives, and psychobiographical 
analysis (Cuhadar et al. 2017; Dyson 2006; Hermann 1980; Kesgin 2013; van Esch and 
Swinkels 2015; George 1969; Holsti 1970; Levi and Tetlock 1980; Malici and Malici 2005; 
Post 2003; Schafer and Walker 2006a; Thiers 2021)  
 
Within studies emphasizing personality traits, the LTA model—whose leading proponent is, 
as noted, Hermann—classifies leaders’ predominant strategies and styles in approaching 
foreign policy issues. Leadership style is defined as “the ways in which leaders relate to those 
around them, whether constituents or other leaders – how they structure interactions and the 
norms, rules, and principles they use to guide such interactions” (Kaarbo and Hermann 1998, 
244). LTA has produced robust and reliable results in the study both of leaders’ traits and the 
influence of such traits on foreign policy (see Kaarbo 2018).  Hermann (2003) recognizes seven 
specific traits that are useful in assessing leadership style: (1) belief that one can control events; 
(2) need for power; (3) conceptual complexity; (4) self-confidence; (5) tendency to focus on 
problem-solving versus maintenance of the group; (6) distrust; and, (7) in-group bias (see Table 
1).  
 
These sets of traits on their own or as pairs or triplets, as presented in Table 2 below, will be 
critical to assess potential similarities and differences between Trump and Chávez in shedding 
further light on their respective tendencies to adopt noncooperative and conflict-inducing 
behavior at the international level. As outlined earlier in the paper, noncooperative behavior 
refers to a series of threats and actions taken by the leader that undermine collaboration between 
states in multilateral institutions (be they regional or international) as well as the actions that 
undermine bilateral relations, ranging from the use of threats, to coercive measures, to possible 
military action. 
 
Table 1: Personality Traits in LTA 
 
Trait Description  
Belief that one can control events 
(BACE) 
Interpretation of the degree of control over situations  
Need for power (PWR) Need for establishing, maintaining, or restoring one’s power 
Conceptual complexity (CC) Degree to which individuals recognize more than one dimension 
or perspective on issues or topics 
Self-confidence (SC) Sense of self-importance and image of one’s capacity to cope 
satisfactorily with objects and persons  
In-group bias (IGB) A way of perceiving the world in which one’s group holds center 
stage  
Task focus (TASK) Focus on the completion of a task or preserving group spirit and 
morale  
Distrust (DIS) General feeling of doubt and wariness about others; a 
predisposition to be suspicious of others’ motives and actions 
Source:  Hermann (2003). 
 
Additionally,  Hermann (2003) proposes three questions that can be used to build a profile of 
leadership styles. Each question addresses some of the personality traits mentioned above. 
 
Table 2: Questions for Identifying Personality Traits 
Questions Traits 















Source: Hermann (2003). 
 
As shown in our literature review, populist leaders tend to exhibit a personalistic approach to 
advancing policymaking processes. They have also been depicted as rogue actors who 
undermine international cooperation, installing themselves as representatives of the people 
versus an established elite and acting on behalf of the general will. Thus, we expect to find 
differences between these leaders and the average world leader’s personality traits. We also 
expect to see similar patterns in the personality traits that drive leaders to prioritize building 
relationships and taking actions that sustain the nexus leader-people at the expense of more 
cooperative relationships with other international actors and domestic elite groups that do not 
follow the premises of the populist project.  
 
Within the three dimensions proposed by Hermann (2003) (Table 2), the traits that could best 
help explain populists’ foreign policy behavior are the ones that correspond to the third 
question about leaders’ motivations for seeking office. Leaders may be driven by an internal 
focus (a problem), a specific cause, an ideology, or a set of interests, or by the desire for 
feedback such as acceptance, power support, or acclaim from those in their surrounding 
environment (a relationship) (Hermann 2003). In assessing motivation, the focus is put on why 
the leader sought office and their need to preserve and secure the group (Hermann 2003). 
Considering Hermann’s (2003) framework, we expect that populist leaders—in this case, 
Chávez and Trump—share a focus on relationships (low task orientation), high in-group bias, 
and high levels of distrust. 
 
Task orientation versus relationships: Leaders who are highly focused on achieving a given 
task emphasize moving the group forward toward a goal, push the group to work on solving a 
particular problem, and are willing to sacrifice a high level of morale in the group for 
accomplishing that task (Hermann 2003). Conversely, relationship-oriented leaders are 
sensitive to what people want; they emphasize group maintenance, retain constituents’ loyalty, 
and keep morale high (Hermann 2003). Populist leaders’ main characteristic is their personal 
and direct relationship with the people that they represent. Moreover, as soon as the leader feels 
betrayed by their people and closer group, the populist tends to redefine the meaning of the 
people and inner circle of advisors. Shaming the ones that are no longer part of the group is 
part of the leader’s repertoire. Thus, we expect both Chávez and Trump to have a stronger 
focus on relationships compared to their task orientation. We consider populist leaders to be 
more prone to maintaining their followers (the people) in foreign policy issues, which may 
explain why their decisions seem less cooperative and, at times, utilitarian and erratic. Our 
expectation is also in line with the results obtained by Kesgin (2019), who compared Israel’s 
prime ministers and found that leaders who are labeled as hawks have a strong relationship 
focus compared to dovish peers.  
 
In-group bias: Leaders who present high scores on this trait have a strong emotional attachment 
to the in-group (social, political, ethnic) and are prone to perceive only the good aspects of 
their group and deny their weaknesses (Hermann 2003). They are concerned when other 
groups, organizations, or countries try to meddle in their own group’s internal affairs (Hermann 
2003). These leaders tend to see the world in “us versus them” terms, which is in line with the 
description of populists. While we expect to find high levels of in-group bias in the case of 
both Chávez and Trump, research on this trait and its relationship with conflict-inducing 
foreign policy behavior has had mixed results. For instance, Shannon and Keller (2007) found 
that in-group bias is a good predictor of leaders’ willingness to violate international norms. On 
the other hand, and at odds with his original prediction, Kesgin (2019) found that this trait does 
not help distinguish between hawkish and dovish leaders. Lazarevska, Sholl, and Young (2006) 
compared the verbal expressions of terrorist and nonterrorist leaders to identify common 
characteristics in their communication styles. Contrary to their expectations, they found that 
individuals in the terrorist group have lower in-group bias scores than nonterrorist political 
leaders do.  
 
High distrust of others: This is another relevant trait that could help explain populist leaders’ 
noncooperative and sometimes hostile international behavior. Leaders who score high in 
distrust are more suspicious about the motives and actions of others, especially those who are 
seen as competitors. These leaders tend to be vigilant and hypersensitive to criticism. Distrust 
has been widely associated with noncooperative and conflict-inducing behavior in foreign 
policy. For instance,  Kesgin (2019) found that distrust is one of the traits that can, in fact, help 
differentiate between hawkish and dovish leaders. Shannon and Keller (2007) identified high 
distrust as the most important predictor of leaders’ willingness to violate international rules. 
Wesley (2013) linked George W. Bush’s unusually high levels of distrust with his incorrect 
belief about Iraq’s possession of weapons of mass destruction, which led to the 2003 US 
invasion. Through the analysis of British prime ministers, Foster and Keller (2020) show that 
those high in distrust are particularly likely to initiate militarized state disputes when levels of 
economic deterioration increase. All these studies support the assumption that populist leaders 
will score high on this trait.  
 
METHODOLOGY AND DATA 
 
The LTA approach is a content analysis technique developed to address the difficulty and 
sometimes impossibility of conducting a conventional psychological evaluation of political 
leaders. Hermann (2008) indicates that the content analysis method provides a tool to collect 
information about leaders’ beliefs, motives, and relationships with equals, subordinates, and 
constituents. This at-a-distance approach’s central premise is that psychological characteristics 
can be assessed through the systematic analysis of what leaders say. Hermann’s (2003) 
assumption is that the more often leaders use certain words and phrases, the more significant 
such content is to them. Hence, the LTA model is quantitative and uses frequency counts 
(Hermann 2003). Hermann’s technique has produced a sample of 284 world political leaders 
to date, generating norms that allow for comparisons between them across both time and space 
(Cuhadar et al. 2017). LTA has also produced norming groups separated into world regions to 
be able to conduct more specific comparisons.  
 
Following Hermann’s (2003) guidelines, our analysis is based on spontaneous verbal material, 
including interviews and press conferences given by Chávez and Trump. Unlike with official 
speeches, leaders tend to be less in control of what they say during interviews; hence, they are 
more likely to show themselves as they really are (Hermann 2003).  In the case of Trump, we 
collected all his spontaneous remarks from January 2017 to January 2021 as found on the White 
House website in the section “Remarks.” Several of these remarks started with a brief speech, 
but we only drew on his answers to the follow-up questions usually posed by the press. We 
analyzed 1,088,457 words across 519 documents.  
 
In the case of Chávez, we use spontaneous remarks delivered during his mandate from 1999 to 
2012. We also utilized translated material found on LexisNexis’s database as well as our own 
translations of spontaneous remarks originally delivered in Spanish. The verbal material was 
retrieved from the Venezuelan Ministry of Communication and Information and the Todo 
Chávez website.1 We analyzed 190,345 words across 52 documents. We use material from all 
years of Chávez’s and Trump’s respective presidencies to ensure that the profiles are not 
context-specific (Hermann 2003). While there is a difference in terms of the number of words 
analyzed in both profiles, the total in both cases largely surpasses the reliability requirement of 
fifty interview responses of one hundred words or more in length (Hermann 2003). Considering 
the research question, this study employed the sample of 284 world political leaders as the 
norming group to establish comparisons between Chávez and Trump and other decision-
makers. 
 
The data was analyzed using Profiler Plus (version 7.3.15), a software tool developed by Social 
Science Automation Inc. This software automates the assessment of the seven traits of the LTA 
model. Among the advantages of this automation are the possibility of managing large amounts 
of data in a short period of time, increased reliability, and decreased researcher bias.  
 
As stressed earlier, at-a-distance assessment techniques work under the assumption that 
psychological characteristics can be inferred based on people’s verbal expressions (Schafer and 
Walker 2006b). The use of LTA is thus grounded in the idea that the way political leaders 
speak will provide information about their personality traits. Both assumptions may raise some 
issues about the validity of these techniques. One argument that questions the validity of at-a-
distance techniques is that leaders’ psychological characteristics cannot be accurately assessed 
employing verbal material (Schafer 2014). However, this contention is questionable as regular 
psychological assessments in clinical contexts are mostly conducted by analyzing what people 
 
1 This website compiles the interviews, press conferences, and writings of Venezuela’s former leader. It belongs to the 
Institute of Higher Studies of the Supreme Commander Hugo Rafael Chávez Frias’s Thought, created by the Venezuelan 
government in July 2013 to preserve and disseminate his legacy (http://www.todochavezenlaweb.gob.ve). 
say about themselves or the situation they are facing. As Schafer (2014) notes, the linguistic is 
simply another form of behavior, thus being the basis of many forms of psychological analysis. 
Moreover, at-a-distance techniques have been widely utilized to conduct research in this field, 
providing broad-based validity—particularly construct validity (Schafer 2014). Regarding the 
question of authorship, LTA examines spontaneous verbal material to minimize the 
“speechwriter effect.” Finally, to tackle leaders’ possible attempts to deceive or their 
“impression management,” this study employs a large number of utterances surpassing the 
basic requirements for performing this sort of assessment. This work also covers different 






RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Tables 3 and 4 below show the scores for Chávez and Trump on each of the seven personality 
traits plus their Z scores compared to the means for a norming group of world leaders. The low, 
high, and moderate categories are based on the standard deviation from the mean score. If the 
score obtained exceeded one standard deviation above the mean for the sample of the norming 
group, the leader is considered high on the trait in question (Hermann 2003). Likewise, if the 
score is one standard deviation below the norming group, the leader is considered low on the 
trait at hand (Hermann 2003). The categories of “lean high” or “lean low” were utilized when 
the scores were more than 0.5 standard deviations below or above the mean one. 
 
Table 3: Chávez’s LTA Scores 
Trait Chávez’s 








BACE 0.383 (0.7) 0.35 (0.05) Lean High 
PWR 0.196 (-1.3) 0.26 (0.05) Low 
CC 0.611 (0.3) 0.59 (0.06) Average 
SC  0.329 (-0.3) 0.36 (0.1) Average 
IGB  0.104 (-0.9) 0.15 (0.05) Lean Low 
TASK 0.554 (-1.1) 0.63 (0.07) Low 
DIS  0.160 (0.5) 0.13 (0.06) Average 
N 52   
Words 190,345   
 
Table 4: Trump’s LTA Scores 
Trait Trump’s 









BACE 0.381/ (0.6) 0.35 (.05) Lean high 
PWR 0.253/ (-0.1) 0.26 (.05) Average 
CC  0.637/ (0.8) 0.59 (.06) Lean high 
SC  0.494/ (1.3) 0.36 (.10) High 
IGB  0.125/ (-0.5) 0.15 (.05) Average  
TASK 0.530/ (-1.4) 0.63 (.07) Low 
DIS  0.269/ (2.3) 0.13 (.06) High 
N 519   
Words 1,088,457   
 
The results show that both Chávez and Trump present unusual profiles when compared to other 
world leaders. In the case of Trump, only two of the seven traits are within the norming group’s 
average scores (need for power and in-group bias). This unusual profile speaks of a self-
confident and distrustful leader who also presents reduced task orientation compared to other 
world leaders.  
 
In the case of Chávez, three out of seven traits fall within the average scores for the norming 
group (conceptual complexity, self-confidence, and distrust). This profile shows a leader who 
believes he can control events, presenting a lower need for power and reduced task orientation 
compared to other world leaders. This finding supports the claim about populists’ profile and 
behavior differing from the average world leader. In this sense, populists’ personalistic 
approach and their depiction as rogue actors who undermine cooperation can be in part linked 
to their atypical leadership profile compared to other world leaders. While more research needs 
to be conducted to understand the exact effect of overall unusual leadership profiles on foreign 
policy decisions there are some indications in the literature that the “extreme” manifestation of 
personality traits may increase the likelihood of these individuals engaging in low-quality 
decision-making, which in turn increases the prospect of ending up with policy fiascos (see 
Brummer 2016).  
 
To answer our research question, we use the scores presented in Tables 3 and 4 to determine 
patterns in Chávez’s and Trump’s respective personality traits. These results support one of 
our three initial expectations. Compared to the sample of world leaders, both Chávez and 
Trump demonstrate a low focus on task fulfillment (Z = -1.1 and -1.4 respectively), confirming 
that they are mainly motivated by establishing relationships, retaining the loyalty of their 
constituents, and keeping the morale of the group high (Hermann 2003). Camaraderie, loyalty, 
and commitment to the group are qualities highly valued by these types of leaders (Hermann 
2003). 
The relevance that both Chávez and Trump attribute to achieving high morale and a sense of 
unity within their group can be clearly linked to one of the main observable characteristics of 
populist figures: namely their focus on building close ties with their followers and on 
promoting and defending the people they represent against a national and external elite. This 
interpretation also aligns with the idea that populist foreign policy enhances the nexus between 
the leader figure and the people (see Destradi and Plagemann 2019). In this sense, “the people” 
is a diffuse social construction that gives the leader plenty of room to manipulate and define its 
meaning and decide what groups and specific sets of people are in/out of this social category 
(Wehner and Thies 2021).   
Contrary to our expectations, high levels of distrust is not a characteristic that both of these 
leaders share. Chávez shows an average level of distrust (Z = 0.5), indicating that he is 
moderate and does not stand out compared to other world leaders on this trait. On the other 
hand, Trump displays high levels of distrust toward others compared to the sample of world 
leaders (Z = 2.3). This trait can help explain Trump’s predisposition to be suspicious about the 
motives and actions of others, especially those perceived as competitors or to be working 
against his cause or ideology. High levels of distrust can also justify his sensitivity to criticism 
and hypervigilant stance in foreign policy matters, as well as his tendency to do things on his 
own to avoid disruption and sabotage (Hermann 2003). Due to Trump’s marked distrust toward 
others, he was more prone to perceive other actors as threats to his goals and thus to pursue 
more defensive strategies in foreign policy issues. Given his wariness of others, forming 
alliances and building loyalty with followers became relevant parts of his foreign policy 
decisions. On the other hand, Chavez’s moderate levels of distrust could have allowed him to 
engage more actively in joint enterprises with allies that shared similar ideologies and interests.  
 
At odds with our expectations, in-group bias, which is associated with nationalism, is not a trait 
that appears to explain these two leaders’ less cooperative and conflict-inducing foreign policy 
behavior. Chávez leans low in this trait while Trump obtains an average score compared to 
other world leaders (Z = -0.9 and -0.5 respectively). According to Hermann’s (2003) 
description, this result shows that while both leaders were still interested in the maintenance of 
their in-group, they were more willing to categorize people based on the nature of the situation 
at hand, so the “we-them” categorization remained fluid and ever-changing depending on the 
context.  
 
The combination of scores on distrust and in-group bias sheds light on leaders’ motivation in 
how they act toward the world at large (Hermann 2003). In the case of Chávez, his leaning-
low scores on in-group bias and average distrust speak of a leader able to recognize the 
opportunities and threats in the environment and envision win-win agreements (Hermann 
2003). This could explain his interest in creating and strengthening regional schemes such as 
ALBA, Petrocaribe, and Banco del Sur. These enterprises, developed with like-minded leaders, 
acted as both a mechanism to promote the benefits of his socialist model and to protect it against 
external threats through loyal alliances. In the case of Trump, his scores cannot be clearly 
located within Hermann’s categories and definitions; considering his results on each trait, 
however, it can be argued that he proved himself capable of establishing a working relationship 
with other groups, but would be extremely cautious and vigilant about others’ behavior in the 
international arena. This combination could make him more prone to changing his mind 
quickly when it came to international cooperation and hence appear more erratic and 
unpredictable.  
 
One of the reasons we expected these populist leaders to score high in their levels of in-group 
bias was the association we made between this trait and leaders’ reduced ability to perceive the 
good aspects of other groups—overrating their own skills and capacities, which could induce 
poorer decision-making and result in conflict-prone foreign policy behavior. However, as 
mentioned earlier, research on this trait has produced mixed results. In the context of 
groupthink, Schafer and Crichlow (2010) problematize the idea of high in-group bias as a clear 
driver of poor decision-making. They find that leaders who score high on in-group bias are 
likely to engage in decision-making that features fewer faults. One of the reasons for this is 
that for groups to solve problems and coordinate complex policies, leaders must believe in and 
support their group in order to help them carry out decision-making in superior ways (Schafer 
and Crichlow 2010, 239). In this sense and contrary to our initial reasoning, populist leaders’ 
tendency to pursue noncooperative and conflict-inducing behavior can result from low levels 
of in-group bias—especially in the case of Chávez. However, this issue needs further research 
to arrive at more accurate conclusions.   
 
The analysis of Chávez’s and Trump’s profiles reveals other similarities and differences worth 
mentioning, as they have implications for the way they led their respective countries. Both 
leaders display leaning-high scores on their belief in the ability to control events (Chavez Z = 
0.7; Trump Z = 0.6), meaning that they perceived that they could exercise some degree of 
control over the situations in which they found themselves (Hermann 2003). Leaders scoring 
high on this trait are likely to pursue active policy agendas, seeking to exert control over 
policymaking, and are less prone to delegate tasks to others (Shannon and Keller 2007). In 
times of crises, leaders strong on this belief are more prone to take a central role in the decision-
making process (van Esch and Swinkels 2015).  
 
Regarding the trait need for power, both leaders’ scores differ. Trump’s are average (Z = -0.1), 
meaning that he does not stand out in his need for power compared to other world leaders. On 
the other hand, Chávez’s need for power is lower than other world leaders (Z = -1.3). This 
score indicates that Chávez tended to have less of a requirement to be in charge and was 
inclined to make an effort to empower others, engender high morale, a sense of team spirit, and 
goal clarity (Hermann 2003). These results make sense if we consider that a central element in 
Chávez’s rhetoric was the relevance he attributed to empowering the people who had been 
oppressed by the political system in Venezuela before he came to power. While these results 
may seem at first sight counterintuitive, they make sense when combined with these leaders’ 
high focus on relationships. The average and low scores obtained by Trump and Chávez on 
need for power can be explained by the particular relationship that exists between populist 
leaders and their followers. In line with the aforementioned people-elite-general will triad, the 
actions of populist leaders are framed as representing the general will of the people, not as a 
personal enterprise to seek power.   
 
Moreover, as indicated in Table 2 above, leaders’ scores on the ability to control events and 
the need for power are indicators of whether they respect or challenge constraints. Considering 
Chávez’s and Trump’s leaning-high scores on the belief they could control events and their 
low and moderate scores on need for power respectively it can be argued that both were 
inclined to take charge of what happens and challenge constraints, but they would not be as 
successful in reading how to manipulate the people and exert the desired influence (Hermann 
2003). Leaders with these characteristics tend to be too direct and open in their use of power, 
which undermines their capacity to have an impact on people (Hermann 2003). This 
combination of traits can help explain the overall perception of these leaders as extremely 
power-oriented. While exerting power and influencing people are common goals among 
political leaders, Chávez’s and Trump’s straightforward style made them less successful in 
leveraging this influence either in their favor or in a subtle manner. Research has also shown 
that when self-confidence scores are lower than conceptual complexity ones, the leader may 
feel overwhelmed or become anxious in dealing with the world’s complexities (Schafer and 
Crichlow 2010), which can explain poor decision-making. 
 
We also found differences in the traits conceptual complexity and self-confidence. While 
Chávez’s scores on both traits are within the averages of world leaders (Z = 0.3 and Z = -0.3 
respectively), meaning that these characteristics do not stand out compared to other leaders, 
Trump’s conceptual complexity leans high (Z = 0.8) and his self-confidence is higher than 
other world leaders (Z = 1.3). While Trump’s leaning-high scores on conceptual complexity 
may seem contradictory as high levels on this trait are usually associated with leaders who are 
able to analyze contextual information and consider multiple perspectives when solving a 
problem, high complexity may also lead to a leader who is overwhelmed by information in the 
surrounding environment (Schafer and Crichlow 2010). 
 
In this sense, high scores could produce problems in decision-making as a result of “undue 
equivocation, mixed signals to advisors and international actors or putting off important 
matters” (Schafer and Crichlow 2010, 61). In terms of self-confidence, high scores on this trait 
reflect a strong sense of self-importance and confidence in their ability to cope with the 
presenting environment (Hermann 2003). These types of leaders rely on their own worldviews 
and instincts, and feel less threatened by their surroundings (van Esch and Swinkels 2015). 
High scores on this trait have also been associated with a predisposition to making decisions 
that end up with fiascos (see Brummer 2016). Thus, Trump’s scores on both traits speak about 
a leader who feels overly confident but tends to be overwhelmed by the events around him, 
which may lead to poor decision-making. 
 
Combining conceptual complexity and self-confidence provides information on leaders’ 
openness to contextual information (Table 2). Leaders who are high in both conceptual 
complexity and self-confidence, as in the case of Trump, are generally open to such 
information. When leaders are so, they can be quite strategic in their behavior, focusing their 
attention on what is feasible at any given point in time (Hermann 2003). Likewise, these types 
of leaders like to become the center of any information network, allowing them to be in the 
middle of all decisions (Hermann 2003). An interesting characteristic of leaders who score high 
on both traits is that their behavior can be perceived as highly erratic and changeable, and their 
actions may seem indecisive and chameleon-like as they are considering different options in 
order to arrive at a final choice (Hermann 2003).  
 
On the other hand, while Chávez’s scores are within the mean of world leaders according to 
the LTA framework he can still be classified as a leader open to incoming information as his 
conceptual complexity score is higher than his self-confidence one. His moderate scores 
indicate that Chávez was pragmatic and responsive to external information (Hermann 2003). 
Considering the scores of both leaders on this trait, it can be argued that populists do not 
necessarily always see the world in black-and-white terms. On the contrary, these preliminary 
findings show that to retain the loyalty of their followers, populist leaders need to be able to 
identify and consider different options before making binding decisions in the realm of foreign 
policy.  
 
Furthermore, populist leaders should be open to incoming information and have the capacity 
to change strategy if that is deemed necessary to keep the nexus with the people of the populist 
project as the main priority. While this may differ from the overall public perception of these 
leaders as obstinate and closed to new information, the results are in line with their capacity to 
take advantage of and capitalize on people’s discontent, distrust, and polarization to achieve 
their political goals. This characteristic, along with their pragmatism, can, for instance, partially 
explain the tendency to retract promises and change orientation observed for some populist 
leaders. These individuals tend to modify their positions as long as they can still maintain a 
strong relationship with their followers after doing so. The degree of openness to contextual 
information in the case of Trump supports what scholars and policy analysts have described as 
his erratic and fluctuating behavior and decisions in foreign policy (see Drezner 2020; Cohen 
2019; see also, Destradi and Plagemann 2019). At the same time, this ability to evaluate options 
and change position if necessary is something that Chávez mastered in Venezuela’s 
relationship with the US and Latin American peers (see Raby 2011).  
 
CONCLUSION 
This paper has brought a political psychology and agent-centered approach to studying populist 
leaders’ behavior in international relations. Employing the Leadership Trait Analysis 
framework, this contribution intended to shed light on further possible explanations for populist 
leaders’ noncooperative and conflict-prone actions in the international arena. While not 
representing conclusive evidence, the findings lend weight to the idea that populist leaders’ 
foreign policy behavior is not only explained by ideological positions but also by personal 
characteristics that might, in fact, increase the likelihood of engaging in less cooperative and 
more conflict-inducing behavior in foreign policy. These findings complement the existing IR 
literature that show how populists adopt revisionist positions, and furthermore affect the 
systemic stability of the international liberal order by taking up specific ideas and ideologies. 
 
While the LTA results confirmed only one of our initial expectations, the study has 
nevertheless still yielded interesting findings that can contribute to the literature on populism 
in IR. First, populists’ profiles tend to differ from the average world leader as the former display 
more extreme personality traits, helping explain their unusual behavior. However, more 
research needs to be done to better understand the connection between these extreme traits and 
noncooperative and conflict-prone foreign policy behavior. Although high scores may help 
explain such behavior, by no means do they suggest that all leaders who present extreme traits 
are populists. These results do provide, though, a pattern of key relevance when studying 
populist leaders.  
 
The analysis of Trump’s and Chavez’s scores shows that the characteristics that appear as the 
strongest predictors of these leaders’ noncooperative and conflict-prone behavior in the 
international arena are their low task orientation and high focus on relationships. In this sense, 
the impact of populism in foreign policy can be linked with these leaders’ tendency to enhance 
the nexus with the people in standing against an elite at home and abroad. Populist leaders give 
priority to the building and fueling of the group mentality, helping explain their actions in the 
international arena. The priorities of maintaining group morale and focusing on building 
relationships tend to confirm that populist leaders are less keen on using the foreign policy 
bureaucratic apparatus and prefer to rely more on a reduced group of people who can be 
considered part of their group instead. However, if the trusted people of the group disappoint 
the leader they become political opponents; the leader blames and shames them, as they are no 
longer considered members of the inner circle.  
 
This study also showed other characteristics common to Chávez and Trump that could shed 
further light on populist behavior in foreign policy terms. Both leaders leant high in their belief 
that they could control events, making them more prone to carrying out an active foreign policy 
agenda and taking center stage in decision-making processes. This characteristic is easily 
observable for both of these leaders. While Trump and Chávez tended to challenge constraints, 
they were less successful in using their power to persuade people within their inner circle as 
they appeared too direct.  
 
This characteristic can be linked to their erratic relationship with their advisors and close 
collaborators. Both leaders had a track record of publicly ousting teammates, collaborators 
going rogue, and infamous controversies with former close associates. Moreover, both leaders 
demonstrated openness to new information, being in line with their capacity and willingness to 
change foreign policy as many times as necessary to keep up the bond with the people they 
claimed to represent. In this sense, both leaders indeed showed the ability to adapt and respond 
to the audience of people who sustained them in power when taking foreign policy decisions. 
As anecdotic as it may sound, the tariff policy of Trump toward China and his renegotiation of 
the North American Free Trade Agreement tended to enhance his follower group’s morale—
as did the slogans “America First” and “Make America Great Again.” Similarly, Chávez’s 
selective rhetorical attacks—especially against the United States as the “Empire”—also 
generated cohesion and increased the leader-people bond in the face of a national and regional 
elite whose behavior was constructed as helping promote the extension of US influence within 
both Venezuela and Latin America.  
 
This study has opened up new avenues of research in the study of populist foreign policy. 
Leaders’ personality traits matter and, as seen, are overall consistent with the existing literature 
on populist foreign policy. Nevertheless, more empirical analysis of other cases is needed to 
substantiate or challenge these findings. Focus on building relationships with the identified 
group of people and a close group of advisors (believers in the project) seem to be critical in 
the way the populist leader approaches foreign policy. Thus, new research should explore 
whether this apparent homogeneity in the group affects, and if so how, the decision-making 
process regarding foreign policy. This policy field may be prone to in-group dynamics, as 
divergence from the populist leader’s expectations may mean exclusion from that group.  
 
This paper represents only an initial step in marrying mind and action in the study of populism 
in world politics and the tendency of these leaders to act in a noncooperative way. The scrutiny 
of the personality traits of Chávez and Trump has shown that beyond the eventual impact of 
the head of government on the world at large, as the key agent in the foreign policy of their 
state, what the populist leader is doing when making foreign policy—whether bilaterally or 
multilaterally—is to continue solidifying their own understanding of the nexus leader-follower 
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